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Abstract 
The aims of this study were (1) to analyse whether informal care, provided by children or 
grandchildren to their elderly parents, and formal care are substitutes or complements, and (2) whether 
this relationship differs across Europe. The analyses were based on the newly developed SHARE 
(Survey of Health, Age, and Retirement in Europe) database. We found (1) that informal- and formal 
home care are substitutes, while informal care is a complement to doctor- and hospital visits, and (2) 
that these relationships in some cases differ according to a north-south gradient. 
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release 1 of SHARE 2004. This release is preliminary and may contain errors that will be corrected in 
later releases. The SHARE data collection has been primarily funded by the European Commission 
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nationally funded. The SHARE data set is introduced in Börsch-Supan et al. 2005; methodological 
details are contained in Börsch-Supan and Jürges 2005. Additional funding for the Swedish 
participation in the SHARE data collection project came from the Bank of Sweden Tercentenary 
Foundation, the Swedish Council for Working Life and Social Research, and the Swedish Social 
Insurance Agency. The research reported in this paper was supported by a grant from the Swedish 
Council for Working Life and Social Research, which is gratefully acknowledged. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Empirical studies have found a correlation between the amount of care and assistance 
supplied by close relatives or neighbours (informal care) and the amount of care 
supplied by the institutionalised health- and social-care systems (formal care). In two 
recent papers by Van Houtven & Norton [1] and Charles & Sevak [2], respectively, 
evidence was obtained suggesting that informal- and formal care were substitutes in 
the US. Previous studies have provided mixed evidence, however [3-5]. Whether 
informal care and formal care are substitutes or complements, naturally, depends on 
the exact purpose for using it. Basically, health care is utilised either in order to 
restore or to maintain health, whereas long-term care is provided in order to increase 
general welfare by facilitating the activities of daily living [6]. It seems unlikely that 
informal care is a substitute for formal care, when the purpose is to restore health in 
the case when highly qualified and specialised health care is demanded. On the other 
hand, when it comes to the day-to-day actions taken in order to assist in activities of 
daily living, it seems conceivable that informal- and formal care and assistance may 
be either substitutes or complements. For instance, informal care may make adverse 
future health outcomes less likely or formal care more productive, giving rise to a 
negative relationship between the two. A positive relationship may result, when 
informal care is comprised of advice and/or if the provider of informal care acts as the 
agent of the receiver of care [1,7,8].   
The relevance of studying the relationship between informal- and formal 
care is highlighted by the fact that the populations in the European countries are 
growing older, which is brought on by the simultaneous decline in mortality- and 
fertility rates, and which provokes the expectation that the demand for health care and 
care for the elderly will rise accordingly. The proportion of individuals aged 65 and 
over in the 25 member countries of EU is expected to rise from about today’s 16 
percent to 30 percent in the year 2050 [9]. Moreover, the proportion of individuals 
aged 80 and more is expected to almost triple, from 4.0 percent in 2004 to 11.4 
percent in 2050 [9]. The increase in the share of elderly in the population is likely to 
induce a positive shift in the demand for health- and social care, which may put 
additional pressure on the performance and finance of existing health- and elderly 
care systems. In the highest age groups of the population there are many individuals 
who have long-standing physical and/or mental disability and are dependent on 
assistance with basic activities of daily living through various forms of long-term 
 3
care. In addition, a number of studies have found that health-care costs rise as the 
proportion of elderly increases [10-12], even though the population age structure has 
usually been found insignificant in explaining inter-country differences in health-care 
expenditures [13]. There is, hence, a growing concern about increasing expenditure on 
long-term care services and health care over the next few decades, because of the 
continuing growth in the number and share of the oldest people [14]. 
Estimated trends on spending in long-term- and health-care for the 
elderly are highly sensitive, though, to trends in health status and disability of the old 
and very old of the population. Estimated shares of GDP on spending for the elderly 
are also highly sensitive to assumptions about the development of overall 
productivity, labour market participation, and the availability of informal care givers. 
For individuals with elderly parents, participation in the labour market and giving 
informal care and assistance are, of course, inter-related decisions [15-17]. In order to 
shape public-policy efforts aiming at elderly people’s health and welfare, it is 
necessary to identify all the processes behind the utilisation of different components 
of health- and elderly care. Here, however, we shall concentrate on one of these 
issues, viz., whether informal and formal care and assistance are substitutes or 
complements.  
A suitable theoretical framework for our analysis is the extension of 
Grossman’s demand-for-health model [18] in order to include the provision of 
informal care developed by Van Houtven and Norton [1]. Their model is a static 
model of a game between parent and child: the parent chooses the amount of formal 
care (medical care in the model) given the amount of informal care provided by the 
child. Comparative static analysis of the optimal parental choice yields theoretical 
results which suggest when informal care is a substitute or a complement to formal 
care conditional on the qualitative content of formal care.    
  The model incorporates health as a utility-providing good. It is a 
function of a set of choice variables, which may be interpreted as a production 
function. Further, the child is able to directly influence the level of parental health by 
his or her choices of informal care, which introduces a strategic component into the 
process of making decisions (extensions of the demand-for-health model, which 
incorporate health-related decisions in a family context, were developed by Bolin et 
al. [19-20]). Formally, the Van Houtven and Norton model produces predictions in 
terms of a second-order derivative: the derivative of the marginal product of formal 
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care (in the production of health) with respect to informal care. However, the model 
does not say anything about how each particular type of formal- and informal care 
corresponds to a specific functional form and parameterisation of the production 
function. Thus, whether or not formal care and informal care are complements or 
substitutes is an empirical question (which Van Houtven and Norton also pointed out 
in their paper). However, the general validity of the model – that the utilisation of 
formal- and informal care, respectively, is endogenously decided – should be taken 
into account in the empirical analysis.   
There may be other motives for providing informal care, though, than 
those directly implied by the Van Houtven and Norton model. For instance, strategic 
effects imposed by the family-structure and/or effects on future bequests of current 
informal care provision. Thus, the processes, which generate the observed utilisation 
of informal- and formal care, respectively, are likely to differ between those who are 
cohabiting and those who live as singles [19-20]. 1   
 Surveys and available time-use studies consistently estimate informal 
care and assistance to be in the range of 80 percent plus of all hours of care and 
assistance provided [14, p. 108]. So, the production of informal care is extensive. As 
long as the partner is alive, he or she is most often the informal caregiver, while adult 
children may take the main responsibility for assisting their single-living parents with 
basic activities of daily living. Thus, partners and children provide, respectively, 18 
and 38 percent of all informal care provided in Austria, 32 and 28 percent in 
Germany, and 23 and 38 percent in Spain. For Sweden, there is no comparable 
information on partners; children account for 46 percent of all informal care provided, 
though [14, table A.6]. It should be observed, however, that definitions might differ 
among countries.  
The objective of our present study was to examine the relationship 
between informal and formal care and assistance and to what extent the relationship 
differs across Europe according to a north-south gradient. There is substantial 
evidence that there are cultural differences between northern and southern Europe, 
which motivate such a focus. Southern European countries are commonly referred to 
as “strong-family-ties countries” and their northern European counterparts as “weak-
family-ties countries” [21]. The strength of family ties is usually discussed in terms of 
cultural patterns of family loyalties, allegiances, and authority, but it also concerns 
demographic patterns of intra-generational co-residence and patterns of support for 
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the elderly.2 Kohli et al. [22] also associate the ”weak-strong” dichotomy to a 
European North-South gradient. Here, the Scandinavian countries are found to have 
the “weakest” family ties, the Mediterranean countries the “strongest”, whereas the 
continental countries lie somewhere in between. These patterns are also reflected by 
the fact that public spending on long-term care varies to a large extent between 
northern and southern European countries. For instance, spending on long-term care 
for females is typically highest in northern countries, such as Sweden and Denmark, 
who spend €19,867 and €22,336 per capita, respectively. Central European countries, 
such as Germany and Belgium spend less, €5,921 and €5,667, respectively. The 
lowest amounts are typically spent in southern European countries, such as Italy, who 
spends €4,764 per  capita [23]. In 2000, public spending on long-term care as a 
percentage of GDP has been reported to be 2.74 in Sweden, 1.32 in Austria, 1.31 in 
the Netherlands, 0.95 in Germany, and 0.16 in Spain [14]. 
Moreover, cultural differences may be reflected also by a north-south 
gradient in the overall design of the welfare systems of Europe. Health-care systems, 
commonly referred to as national health services, are found in the Nordic countries 
and the UK; social-insurance systems are found in central Europe; whereas the 
systems established in the late 1970s and early 1980s in southern European countries 
may be seen as a “third way” [24, pp. 5-7]. True, there are differences in the design of 
organising and financing long-term and health care among countries and within 
countries that may not follow a north-south gradient [14, 25]. If these differences have 
an impact of their own on the relation between formal and informal care, they may, of 
course, weaken our possibilities to detect a north-south gradient. It still seems to be a 
fruitful research issue to explore in this paper, however. 
In our analyses, we made use of a recently developed cross-national 
database, SHARE (Survey of Health, Ageing, and Retirement), containing 
comparable information at the individual level from 11 European countries. 
Moreover, SHARE contains detailed information on the utilization of both informal 
and formal care. We considered informal care and assistance, supplied by children or 
grandchildren, and its respective effects on five different types of formal care, for 
those living as singles.3 In brief, we found (1) that informal care reduces the 
probability of utilisation of formal care provided in the household, and (2) that 
informal care increases the probability and the amount of utilisation of other types of 
formal care. Thus, our results suggest that informal and formal care both provided in 
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the household are substitutes, while informal care provided in the household and 
formal care provided in hospitals or doctors’ offices are complements. Moreover, the 
relationships seem to differ among the three European regions of study.  
The paper proceeds as follows. First, the data will be presented. Second, 
the empirical methods used in the paper are described. Third, the results are presented. 
The paper concludes with a discussion of the policy-implications of our results, 
interpreted in the modified Grossman framework, provided by Van Houtven and 
Norton [1].  
 
DATA 
The Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe (SHARE) is a 
multidisciplinary and cross-national micro database containing approximately 22,000 
Europeans over the age of 50 years of age and their spouses. The first wave of data 
was collected in 2004. It contains representative samples from the non-
institutionalised population in respective participating country. The countries 
represent northern Europe (Denmark and Sweden), central Europe (Austria, France, 
Germany, Switzerland, Belgium, and the Netherlands), and southern Europe (Spain, 
Italy and Greece). Data from Belgium was not available at the time of writing. The 
database comprises information on health-related variables, for instance, self-reported 
health, physical functioning, cognitive functioning, psychological health, well-being, 
life satisfaction, and health care seeking behaviour, labour market variables, for 
instance, current work activity, job characteristics, opportunities to work past 
retirement age; economic variables, for instance, sources and composition of current 
income, wealth and consumption. Other variables include education, housing, and 
social support variables, for instance, assistance within families,  informal care, 
transfers of income and assets, and social networks.  
SHARE follows the design of the U.S. Health and Retirement Study 
(HRS) and the English Longitudinal Study of Ageing (ELSA). Response rates in 
SHARE ranged from 38% in Switzerland to 69% in France and the average response 
rate was 55%. A description of methodological issues can be found in Börsch-Supan 
& Jörges [26].  
 In our analyses, the sample was restricted to those who (1) lived as 
singles, (2) had at least one child, and (3) belonged to the age-group 50+. This left us 
with 3,559 observations. Single parents could be divorced, widowed, never married, 
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or married but living separately. For singles 50+, children are the main providers of 
informal care. Based on SHARE data, it is estimated that children, including 
grandchildren, adopted, fostered and step children, provide 83% of all informal care 
for this group.4 
 
Dependent variables 
Formal care 
We analysed formal care employing 9 separate dependent variables – 5 categorical 
variables indicating whether or not the respondent had any formal care utilisation, and 
4 variables indicating the amount of utilisation – all for the past 12 months. The 
categorical variables were: (1) formal care provided in the household environment5; 
this variable was defined as having received any of the following categories of care: 
(a) professional or paid nursing or personal care, (b) professional or paid home help 
concerning domestic tasks that you could not perform yourself due to health 
problems, and (c) meals-on-wheels; (2) a doctor (GP or specialist) visit, (3) a GP visit, 
or (4) a specialist visit; (5) a hospital night. The variables indicating the amount of 
utilisation were: the number of (1) doctor visits, (2) GP visits, (3) specialist visits, and 
(4) hospital nights. Unfortunately, nursing home care was not included, since SHARE 
only covers the non-institutionalised population. In Table 1 and 2, descriptive 
statistics on formal care by country are shown.  
 
Explanatory variables 
Informal care  
Informal care is comprised of the following components: (1) personal care, e.g. 
dressing, bathing or showering, eating, getting in or out of bed, and using the toilet, 
(2) practical household help, e.g. with home repairs, gardening, transportation, 
shopping, and household chores, and (3) help with paperwork, such as filling out 
forms, and settling financial or legal matters. They obviously consist of assistance as 
well as care, but for simplicity, all help will be named informal care in the following.6  
 In the survey, the respondent was first asked about the frequency of 
which he/she received informal care during the past 12 months. The alternatives given 
were: (1) almost every day, (2) almost every week, (3) almost every month, and (4) 
less often. Next, the respondent was asked to give an estimate of the number of hours 
of informal care received on a typical day/in a typical week/in a typical month/in the 
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last twelve months.7 In order to make the answers comparable between respondents, 
we created a variable indicating for each respondent the number of hours past year 
that he/she received informal care. This variable was constructed as follows: If the 
respondent answered that he/she received informal care almost every day, we 
multiplied the number of hours received on a typical day by 365. If the respondent 
answered almost every week, the number of hours per week were multiplied by 52. In 
a similar vain, if the respondent answered almost every month, the number of hours 
per months were multiplied by 12. Finally, if the respondent answered that he/she 
received informal care less often than each month, he/she was asked to give an 
estimate of the total number of hours of informal care received past year. This 
estimate was kept as it was. Table 3 shows descriptive statistics on informal care. 
 Time diaries have been considered as the ’gold standard’ for 
measurement of time provided for informal care [27]. Such diaries are not feasible in 
large surveys, such as SHARE, since they are too time-consuming. The recall method, 
used in SHARE, has been found to be a valid method, if it can be assumed that 
respondents take into account joint production, i.e. the possibility of performing 
several informal care tasks at the same time, when completing the recall questionnaire 
[27]. Robinson [28] found evidence that respondents corrected for such joint 
production when completing a recall questionnaire. It should also be observed that the 
data here relates to received (as opposed to provided) care and assistance. 
 
Other explanatory variables 
In Table 4, a description of our independent and dependent variables is given. The 
mean age of the respondents was 64 years, and 55 percent were women. Moreover, 
the typical respondent was born in the country in which the interview took place 
(92%) and had on average 10 years of education. Four variables were used to capture 
the health status of the respondent. On average, the respondents had 1.53 health 
conditions (out of 14 listed)8, 1.5 symptoms (out of 11 listed)9, and 1.47 limitations 
(out of 10 listed)10. Self-reported health averaged 2.68 on a 1-5 scale were 1 indicated 
excellent health and 5 bad health. Smokers constituted 20 percent of the sample, and 
28 percent reported being former smokers. The regressions also included country 
dummies, where Sweden was the omitted reference category. In the interacted models 
the country dummies were replaced with regional dummies.  
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EMPIRICAL METHOD AND SPECIFICATION 
Probit models were used to analyse the probability of having had (1) care provided in 
the household environment, (2) a doctor visit, (3) a GP visit, (4) a specialist visit, or 
(5) a hospital night, respectively. When estimating the quantities, conditional on 
strictly positive utilisation, OLS was used; in all cases the dependent variable was 
logged in order to reduce the influence of outliers. Formally, we may write the 
parent’s utilisation of formal care as: 
 
),,,,( ijiiiijij IXHIHfFH ε= , j = 1,…,9   (1) 
 
where FHij denotes utilization of formal care of type j by parent I and IHi  hours of 
informal care. In equation (1), Hi denotes health status, Xi socio-economic and 
demographic characteristics, Ci the country, and εij an unobserved error term. The 
country dummies are included to capture some of the unobserved factors at the 
country level, such as the institutional framework, that vary between different 
European countries and that may affect formal health care utilisation. 
The notion that informal- and formal care are used as inputs, either as 
substitutes or as complements, into the production of health investments suggests a 
high likelihood of there being unobserved variables, which affect both informal- and 
formal care. In order to take this into account, instrumental variables methods were 
employed. We followed the strategy used by Van Houtven & Norton [1] of employing 
different child characteristics as instruments of informal care.  
 Variables assumed to affect the amount of informal care received from 
children and grandchildren, but not directly the amount of formal care by the parent 
were used as instruments. Thus, we used variables indicating the number of children, 
whether the oldest child lived more than 100 kilometres away, and the age of the 
oldest child.11 The number of children averaged 2.42 in the sample and the mean age 
of the eldest child was 37 years. Of these, 58 percent were employed. Further, the 
instruments described above were chosen since they passed tests of over-identification 
and relevance. Results from these tests are presented in Table 6.  
 In cases where the dependent variable was continuous, we used the 
2SLS regression method. In cases where the dependent variable was dichotomous, we 
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used the Amemiya Generalized Least Squares (AGLS) estimator, which estimates a 
probit model with a continuous endogenous explanatory variable.12 
 
RESULTS 
In Table 5, the results from our regressions are summarised. Results are shown using 
both the OLS/probit model and the instrumental variables OLS/probit model. In Table 
5, only the marginal effects/coefficients of hours of informal care are presented in 
order to preserve space (the full results are available on request). Table 6 then 
summarises the results from the various econometrics tests employed in the 
instrumental-variables regressions.  
 
Formal home care 
In the first row of Table 5, the results from the regressions on formal home care are 
shown. First, using the ordinary probit model, a positive and significant relationship 
was obtained between hours of informal care and the probability of having received 
any formal home care, suggesting that informal- and formal care are complements. 
Second, using the instrumental variables probit estimator, we obtained a negative and 
significant correlation between informal- and formal care, suggesting that the two are 
substitutes.  
Testing for the appropriateness of the employed instruments, we (1) rejected the null 
hypothesis that the instruments have no joint effect (F = 30.59, p < 0.01), and we (2) 
were not able to reject the null hypothesis that the instruments were jointly valid; the 
instruments which were excluded from the main regression passed the test for over-
identifying restrictions (p = 0.94). We also tested the null hypothesis that informal 
care is exogenous [29]. The predicted residual from the first-stage regression was 
significant at the 1% level when included along with hours of informal care in the 
formal home care regression and, hence, the null hypothesis was rejected at the 1% 
level. The preferred specification is, hence, the one treating informal care as 
endogenous. The estimated marginal effect of informal care, -0.06, suggests that a 10 
percent increase in informal care hours leads to a 0.6 percentage points decrease in the 
probability of using formal home care.  
 
Other formal care 
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Next, we turn to the results from the regressions of other types of formal care than 
formal care provided in the household. As shown in Table 5, when estimated without 
taking the potential endogeneity of informal care into account, the results showed a 
positive and significant correlation between hours of informal care and (1) the 
probability of having any (a) specialist visits, and (b) hospital nights; and (2) the 
number of (a) doctor visits, and (b) GP visits. In the other cases, the effect was 
statistically insignificant. 
 When employing the IV-Probit/2SLS estimators, however, the effect of 
informal care was not statistically significant in any of the regressions on doctor visits 
or hospital nights. Testing for the appropriateness of the employed instruments we (1) 
rejected the null hypothesis that the instruments had no joint effect, and (2) were not 
able to reject the null hypothesis that the instruments were jointly valid; the 
instruments, which were excluded from the main regression in all cases, passed the 
test for over-identifying restrictions. We were not able, however, to reject the 
hypothesis that informal care was exogenous. Consequently, the preferred 
specification is the one treating informal care as exogenous in the regressions. It 
seems, thus, as if informal care complements formal care in the case of doctor visits 
and hospital nights. The estimated effect of informal care on doctor visits, 0.03, 
suggests that a 10 percent increase in hours of informal care leads to a 0.3 percent 
increase in the number of doctor visits among people having at least one visit. 
Concerning hospital nights, the estimated marginal effect of 0.01 suggests that a 10 
percent increase in annual hours of informal care is associated with 0.1 percentage 
points decrease in the probability of having at least one annual hospital night.  
 
Interactions effects 
We also considered whether the results obtained above differed across different parts 
of Europe. For this purpose, the participating countries were first divided into three 
sub-groups, according to a north-south gradient. The first group consisted of the 
Nordic countries Sweden and Denmark (Nordic). The second group was comprised of 
countries in central Europe: Germany, France, Netherlands, Austria, Switzerland 
(Central). In the third group, the southern European countries Spain, Italy, and Greece 
(Southern) were included. In order to investigate whether the effects differed between 
these country groups, we created interaction variables between the amount of informal 
care received and country group. The same regressions as before were estimated 
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including these interaction terms as explanatory variables. The omitted reference 
category was the country group southern Europe (and, hence, the interaction between 
southern Europe and informal care). The results are presented in Table 7 and 8. 
Again, we restrain the presentation – in this case to the estimated effects of the 
interaction terms and hours of informal care.13   
 We found that for the probability of having had a doctor, a GP, or a 
specialist visit, none of the interaction terms were statistically significant, suggesting 
that the effects did not differ significantly across Europe. Since the results in the 
previous section showed that exogeneity of informal care could not be rejected in the 
case of doctor visits and hospital nights, informal care was here treated as an 
exogenous variable.  
 In the case of formal home care, the interaction term between living in 
central Europe and informal care was statistically significant and positive. This 
suggests that the negative effect of informal care on formal home care is significantly 
lower for people in central Europe, compared to those residing in southern Europe. 
No differential effect was found for those living in the Nordic countries. The IV-
probit model was used here, since the results from the previous section showed that 
the exogeneity of informal care was rejected in the case of formal home care.14 
 Regarding the quantities of formal health care, we found few significant 
interaction terms (Table 8). However, for those living in central Europe we found that 
the positive effect of informal care on the number of GP visits was significantly larger 
compared to those living in southern Europe. Finally, living in northern Europe was 
associated with a significantly smaller effect of informal care on the number of 
specialist visits.  
 
70+ only 
Since utilization of both informal and formal care is much more common among 
people aged 70 and above, our results may have been weakened by the fact that a 
substantial fraction of our sample did not utilize either type of care. In Table 9, the 
results from a sensitivity analysis including only people aged 70 and above are 
presented. Table 10 shows the results of the specification tests from the IV-
regressions; instruments used were exactly the same as the ones used above.15  
As shown in Table 9, the results were robust to changes in the sample. 
The effects that were significant for the full sample were also significant for the 
 13
restricted sample, even though the sample size was roughly halved. Moreover, in the 
specifications treating informal care as exogenous, the magnitude of the effect of 
informal care was virtually unchanged in all but one of the regressions. In the case of 
formal home care, the effect increased from 0.01 to 0.02.  
In Table 10, it is revealed that the exogeneity of informal care was only 
rejected in the regressions on formal home care and having any doctor visit. The 
former result was similar to the result obtained for the full sample. Treating informal 
care as endogenous in the case of formal home care resulted in a marginal effect of –
0.09. This estimate was 50 percent greater than the corresponding marginal effect 
obtained for the full sample, i.e. –0.06. In the case of having any doctor visit, the 
instrumental-variables estimate, which was the preferred one, was positive and 
insignificant. 
In sum, the results were very similar. The most dramatic change was 
that the negative relationship between informal care and formal home care became 
roughly 50 percent greater when restricting the analysis to the older age group.   
 
DISCUSSION 
 
 The results of our study emphasise the importance of testing and 
accounting for the potential endogeneity of informal care. Thus, not doing so resulted 
in a statistically significant and positive correlation between informal care and formal 
home care, while the sign of the correlation was reversed when endogeneity was taken 
into account. In the case of doctor visits and hospital nights, we were unable to reject 
the hypothesis that informal care is exogenous, though. 
The magnitude of the effects obtained in our study might appear 
relatively small. In the case of formal home care, the estimated marginal effect of 
informal care, -0.06, suggests that a 10 percent increase in informal care hours leads 
to a 0.6 percentage points decrease in the probability of using formal home care. Put 
differently, an increase in the annual hours of informal care by 13.2, from the mean of 
132 (corresponding to an increase by 10 percent), would lead to a 13.4 percent 
likelihood of using formal home care from the mean of 14. Moreover, the estimated 
effect of informal care on doctor visits, 0.03, suggests that a 10 percent increase in 
hours of informal care leads to a 0.3 percent increase in the number of doctors visits 
among people having at least one visit. In other words, an increase in hours of 
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informal care by 13.2 would only raise the number of doctor visits to approximately 
8.60 from the mean 8.35. Finally, concerning hospital nights, the estimated marginal 
effect of 0.01 suggests that a 10 percent increase in annual hours of informal care is 
associated with 0.1 percentage points decrease in the probability of having at least one 
annual hospital night. In this case, a 10 percent increase in hours of informal care 
would lead to a 15.9 percent likelihood of having a hospital night from the mean of 
16. It should be remembered, however, that even though the effects appear small, 
there might obviously still be a substantial impact in the case where future changes in 
the amount of informal care provided are large. 
When comparing our results with those of Van Houtven & Norton [1], 
we restrict the comparison to those aged 70 and above. Using data from the US Health 
and Retirement Study (with which SHARE data is consistently comparable), Van 
Houtven & Norton [1] analysed the interrelations between formal care and informal 
care, given by children to their single-living 70+ parents. Similar to our findings, 
informal care was found to be a substitute to formal home care; the hypothesis that 
informal care was exogenous in the regression on formal home care was also rejected. 
The marginal effect obtained by Van Houtven & Norton in the latter case, -0.09, was 
actually identical to the one obtained in the present study, when we restricted the 
analysis to those aged 70 and above. 
When it came to doctor visits and hospital stays, however, the effects 
differed by sign. While Van Houtven & Norton [1] found a significant and negative 
relationship between informal care and physician visits, conditional on having any 
visit, we obtained the opposite result. Moreover, Van Houtven & Norton found 
informal care to be a substitute to hospital nights (given that the individual had any 
hospital night), whereas in our study informal care showed a significant and positive 
relationship with the probability of having any hospital care but no significant effect 
on the number of hospital nights. It should be noted that Van Houtven & Norton 
found informal care to be endogenous in determining formal home care, nursing home 
care, physician visits, and hospital care, while we rejected the exogeneity of informal 
care only in the case of formal home care. 
We found some evidence of the north-south gradient, which is 
commonly claimed in the literature, due to cultural, and hence institutional, 
differences between northern and southern European countries [22]. Regarding formal 
home care, our results suggested that the negative effect of informal care on the 
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former was significantly less in magnitude in central Europe compared to southern 
Europe. Also, the effect was less in magnitude in northern Europe, but the interaction 
effect was not statistically significant in this case. These results suggest that in regions 
with “strong” family ties, i.e. southern Europe, informal care to a greater extent 
substitutes for formal home care. This may reflect strong norms regarding family 
responsibilities, for instance, where family members are expected to supply the major 
part of home care.  
 A few caveats are in order. First, the lack of SHARE data on nursing-
home care means that the total effect on the utilization of formal care resulting from 
changes in informal care remains to be settled. This is especially unfortunate, since 
nursing-home care constitutes a large share of the health- and social-care sectors in 
most European countries. It might be noted, though, that Van Houtven & Norton [1] 
found informal care to be a substitute for nursing home care in a US setting. Second, 
it should, of course, be remembered that the results in this study concerns a sample of 
singles and that the policy implications, hence, only concern this group. In SHARE, 
72 percent of the sample was married or living in registered partnerships, so our sub-
sample represents a minority. Single-living elderly is an important group to analyse 
for policy purposes, however, since they lack the support from a spouse and are more 
exposed to the will of their children. Moreover, the number of single households is 
increasing in most European countries. Finally, the net effect of changes in the 
amount of informal care on long-run expenditures is not straightforward to assess. 
Some of the additional doctor visits that an informal care-giver invoke may be of a 
preventive nature, leading to less expenditures in the long run. Further analyses on 
this issue should opt for a dynamic perspective, for instance, by making use of the 
longitudinal SHARE data that eventually will be made available. 
 Variation in informal care across countries partly reflects variation in the 
availability of professional home-care services. Thus, the latter provides some of the 
desired variation in informal care needed to identify its effect on formal care. 
Admittedly, there is only imperfect information on the variation in accessibility of 
professional home- care services, leading to some unobserved heterogeneity. This 
might bias the results, if unobserved accessibility was correlated with the usage of 
both informal and formal care. Some of this unobserved heterogeneity would be 
picked up by the country dummies, however. Moreover, we controlled for the 
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influence of unobserved heterogeneity by performing IV-regressions, where we also 
could check the endogeneity of informal care. 
Policy-makers, not only in Europe, face a number of challenging issues 
with regard to future provision of health- and social care to the elderly. While the 
demand for care is likely to increase, there are at the same time demographic and 
socio-economic trends that are likely to decrease the availability of informal care. 
During the past decades, the average number of children per women has decreased in 
all European countries [30]. Consequently, future generations will have a smaller 
network to rely upon regarding the provision of informal care. Moreover, increased 
participation of women in the labour market may further reduce the availability of 
informal care. In Greece, for instance, the female percent of the labour force increased 
from 28 to 37 percent just between 1980 and 1998 [31]. Going further back in time, 
changes are obviously even more dramatic. Another trend, possibly affecting the 
supply of informal care, is the tendency in many European countries to raise their 
statutory retirement age [32]. This means that an increasing number of people in their 
50s and 60s will still be working and, hence, have less time to act as informal care-
givers. In addition, factors such as lower marriage rates, greater geographic mobility, 
and declines in intergenerational co-residence are factors contributing to changes in 
the supply of informal care over time, since most informal care-givers are spouses or 
children [33].  
Norms and legislations surrounding informal care vary greatly across 
European countries. While in most countries, children are legally obligated to take 
care of their elderly parents, this is not the case in Sweden, for instance. The existence 
and extent of formalised support programmes for informal care-givers also vary. In 
several countries, the social-insurance system compensates informal care-givers 
taking time off work to care for their elderly parents. The extensiveness of these 
programmes, however, varies to a large extent; in France, for instance, 3 days per year 
are compensated, whereas in Italy, up to 25 days per day are compensated [34]. As a 
result of the demographic and socio-economic trends, norms will probably change, 
too. In this paper, we analysed whether informal- and formal care are substitutes or 
complements among elderly in Europe and whether this relationship differs across 
Europe. The analysis was conducted using a newly developed dataset on Europeans 
older than 50 years of age. To our knowledge, the paper is the first to study informal 
and formal care across Europe using a nationally representative data set and the first 
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to examine differences among the European countries, especially following a north-
south gradient. Further studies should aim at improving our understanding also of the 
differences in effects between Europe and the US. 
Even though informal care will never be able to solve the problems of 
the projected increases in public and private spending on health- and social care for 
the elderly, the knowledge contributed by this study produces essential pieces of 
information. Informal care always comes with a cost, however, with lower degree of 
market participation and lower wages [15-17]. In many European countries, 
dependency ratios are high while birth rates, labour market participation rates, and 
economic growth rates are low. In those countries, there is an obvious conflict of 
targets, introducing a trade-off between increasing the amount of informal care and 
increasing labour market participation. The most optimistic scenario, of course, would 
be one in which the health status of the old and the very old becomes substantially 
improved, which would ease the tension. So far, however, there is no clear evidence 
that this policy-makers’ dream will come true [35-37]. 
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TABLES 
 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics on formal care. Probability of having a doctor visit, GP 
visit, specialist visit, hospital visit, and home care. 
Country Any doctor visit Any GP visit Any specialist 
visit 
Any hospital visit Any home care* 
 Mean sd Mean sd Mean sd Mean sd Mean sd 
Austria 0.89 0.32 0.85 0.36 0.39 0.49 0.23 0.42 0.09 0.29 
Germany 0.93 0.26 0.90 0.30 0.51 0.50 0.18 0.38 0.08 0.28 
Sweden 0.76 0.43 0.67 0.47 0.29 0.46 0.18 0.39 0.12 0.33 
Netherlands 0.87 0.34 0.81 0.39 0.40 0.49 0.10 0.30 0.24 0.43 
Spain 0.93 0.26 0.87 0.34 0.38 0.49 0.15 0.36 0.13 0.34 
Italy 0.89 0.32 0.84 0.37 0.41 0.49 0.14 0.35 0.06 0.24 
France 0.95 0.21 0.89 0.31 0.43 0.50 0.17 0.37 0.23 0.42 
Denmark 0.82 0.38 0.80 0.40 0.15 0.35 0.15 0.36 0.23 0.42 
Greece 0.85 0.36 0.70 0.46 0.35 0.48 0.10 0.30 - - 
Switzerland 0.90 0.30 0.84 0.36 0.34 0.48 0.14 0.34 - - 
           
Total 0.88 0.33 0.81 0.39 0.37 0.48 0.16 0.36 0.14 0.35 
* Information on home care was unavailable for Greece and Switzerland 
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Table 2. Descriptive statistics on formal care. Number of doctor visits, GP visits, 
specialist visits, and hospital visits, conditional on having at least one doctor visit last 
year. 
Country Number of doctor 
visits 
Number of  GP visits Number of specialist 
visits 
Number of hospital 
nights  
 Mean sd Mean sd Mean sd Mean sd 
Austria 8.97 12.63 6.79 9.61 5.30 11.50 14.10 17.06 
Germany 9.80 11.53 7.13 9.48 5.11 7.01 19.23 21.34 
Sweden 4.33 4.71 3.21 3.19 3.46 4.61 7.59 10.04 
Netherlands 5.70 6.00 3.92 3.94 3.96 5.04 10.41 10.89 
Spain 12.73 15.10 10.59 12.69 5.50 10.08 9.80 11.42 
Italy 13.22 16.91 11.66 15.82 4.50 5.19 11.39 12.75 
France 7.68 5.57 6.48 4.56 3.16 3.80 11.72 14.12 
Denmark 5.19 6.68 4.52 5.77 3.52 3.95 20.30 46.91 
Greece 8.86 10.60 7.43 9.73 6.01 7.10 10.73 13.05 
Switzerland 5.39 7.08 4.42 6.79 3.03 3.18 8.12 8.23 
         
Total 8.35 11.02 6.70 9.39 4.59 7.31 13.23 20.91 
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Table 3. Descriptive statistics on informal care. 
Country Annual hours of 
informal care 
Any informal care Annual hours of 
informal care given > 0 
 Mean sd Mean sd Mean sd 
Austria 121.78 469.53 0.38 0.48 324.15 722.97 
Germany 152.78 667.72 0.40 0.49 382.39 1015.61 
Sweden 50.08 329.50 0.42 0.49 119.60 502.03 
Netherlands 56.02 219.55 0.42 0.49 132.42 322.77 
Spain 206.37 1110.48 0.19 0.39 1091.38 2374.96 
Italy 242.26 1295.64 0.21 0.41 1141.54 2638.88 
France 145.49 735.60 0.33 0.47 444.86 1237.28 
Denmark 52.95 218.43 0.40 0.49 131.68 329.67 
Greece 232.09 711.78 0.38 0.49 614.68 1053.70 
Switzerland 19.93 73.57 0.29 0.46 67.96 123.98 
    
Total 132.33 680.52 0.35 0.48 374.86 1105.26 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 25
  
 26
Table 4. Variables and descriptives of the sample in total.  
Variable Description Mean Sd 
Dependent variables    
Any home care 1 if having received any of the following forms 
of home care during the last 12 months: 1) 
Professional or paid nursing or personal care 
2) Professional or paid home help, for domestic 
tasks that you could not perform yourself due to 
health problems 
3) Meals-on-wheels 
0.14 0.35 
Any doctor visit 1 if having any doctor visits past 12 months 0.88 0.33 
Any GP visit 1 if having any GP visits last 12 months 0.81 0.39 
Any specialist visit 1 if having any specialist visits last 12 months 0.37 0.48 
Any hospital nights 1 if having any hospital nights during past 12 
months 
0.16 0.36 
Number of doctor visits Number of doctor visits past 12 months 8.35 11.02 
Log of doctor visits Log of number of doctor visits past 12 months 1.63 0.97 
Number of GP visits Number of GP visits past 12 months 6.70 9.39 
Log of GP visits Log of number of GP visits last 12 months 1.40 0.96 
Number of specialist 
visits 
Number of specialist visits past 12 months 4.59 7.31 
Log of specialist visits Log of number of specialist visits last 12 months 1.04 0.89 
Number of hospital 
nights 
Number of hospital nights past 12 months 13.23 20.91 
Log of hospital nights Log of number of hospital nights last 12 months 1.93 1.15 
    
Explanatory variables    
Annual hours of 
informal care  
Total annual number hours of informal care 132.33 680.52 
Log of annual hours of 
informal care 
Ln (1 + total hours of informal care received past 
12 months) 
0.65 1.76 
Age Age in years 64.43 10.34 
Age squared Age^2 4258.64 1387.92 
Female 1 if female 0.55 0.50 
Years of education Total number of years of education 10.01 4.52 
Country of birth 1 if born in country  0.92 0.27 
Health conditions Number of health conditions out of 14 listed 1.53 1.43 
Self-reported health Self-reported health on a scale from 1 to 5 
(1=excellent, 5=bad) 
2.68 1.06 
Symptoms Number of symptoms out of 11 listed 1.50 1.61 
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Mobility Number of limitations with mobility. arm 
function & fine motor function (out of 10 
described).  
1.47 2.12 
Smoker 1 if current smoker 0.20 0.40 
Former smoker 1 if former smoker 0.28 0.45 
Frequency of alcohol 
consumption 
Frequency of alcohol consumption during past 6 
months (1-7 where 1=almost every day and 7=not 
at all) 
4.32 2.27 
Physical activity I Frequency of vigorous physical activity. such as 
sports. heavy housework. or a job that involves 
physical labour? (1-4, 1=more than once a week, 
4=hardly ever, or never).  
2.50 1.33 
Physical activity II Frequency of engagement in activities that 
require a low or moderate level of energy such as 
gardening. cleaning the car. or doing a walk? (1-
4, 1=more than once a week, 4=hardly ever. or 
never). 
1.55 1.00 
Austria 1 if interviewed in Austria 0.10 0.31 
Italy 1 if interviewed in Italy 0.13 0.33 
Spain 1 if interviewed in Spain 0.10 0.29 
Netherlands 1 if interviewed in Netherlands 0.14 0.34 
Germany 1 if interviewed in Germany 0.14 0.35 
Greece 1 if interviewed in Greece 0.09 0.29 
Switzerland 1 if interviewed in Switzerland 0.05 0.21 
France 1 if interviewed in France 0.07 0.26 
Denmark 1 if interviewed in Denmark 0.08 0.27 
Sweden 1 if interviewed in Sweden 0.11 0.31 
    
Instruments    
Number of children Number of children (natural children, fostered, 
adopted, and those of spouse/partner) 
2.42 1.28 
Child 100 km 1 if the oldest child lives more than 100 
kilometres away 
0.18 0.39 
Age oldest child Age of the oldest child 37.37 11.24 
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Table 5. Effect of logged hours of informal care received past 12 months on formal 
care. 
Dependent variable Probit/OLS 
marginal 
effect/coefficie
nt of informal 
care (se) 
N Ivprobit/ 2SLS 
marginal 
effect/coefficie
nt of informal 
care (se) 
N 
Any home care 0.01 (0.00)** 2.856 -0.06 (0.03)* 2.856 
Any doctor visit 0.00 (0.00) 3.559 0.01 (0.02) 3.545 
Log of doctor visits 
(cond > 0) 
0.03 (0.01)** 3.115 0.07 (0.06) 3.107 
Any GP visit 0.00 (0.00) 3.559 0.02 (0.03) 3.545 
Log of GP visits (cond > 
0) 
0.02 (0.01)** 2.909 0.04 (0.06) 2.902 
Any specialist visit 0.01 (0.00)** 3.559 0.04 (0.04) 3.545 
Log of specialist visits 
(cond > 0)  
0.01 (0.01) 1.423 -0.02 (0.11) 1.420 
Any hospital nights 0.01 (0.00)** 3.559 0.00 (0.02) 3.559 
Log of hospital nights 
(cond > 0) 
0.02 (0.02) 561 -0.06 (0.11) 560 
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
The regressions control for age, age squared, gender, whether born in country, years of education, 
number of health conditions, number of health symptoms, self-reported health, limitations on activity, 
smoking, drinking, sports activities, and other physical activities. In the instrumental variables 
regressions, two variables indicating the number of children and the whether the oldest child lived 
more than 100 kilometres away were used as instruments. An exception was the regressions on having 
any hospital nights, where the age of the oldest child was used instead of the variable indicating the 
number of children. The reason was that the specification using number of children as excluded 
instrument did not pass the test of overidentifying restrictions. Full results are available upon request.  
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Table 6. Specification test of the instrumental variables regression. 
Dependent variable F-test of joint significance 
of excluded instruments 
Test of exclusion 
restrictions (p-value 
of null of valid 
exclusion 
restrictions)* 
Test of null of 
exogeneity (p-value 
of null of exogeneity. 
Wu-Hausman test). 
Any home care F(  2.  2873) =   12.97 0.94 < 0.01 
Any doctor visit F(  2.  3519) =   20.00 0.17 0.57 
Log of doctor visits (cond 
> 0) 
F(  2.  3081) =    18.34 0.43 0.58 
Any GP visit F(  2.  3519) =   20.00 0.36 0.53 
Log of GP visits (cond > 
0) 
F(  2.  2876) =    20.99 0.90 0.80 
Any specialist visit F(  2.  3519) =   20.00 0.37 0.43 
Log of specialist visits 
(cond > 0)  
F(  2.  1394) =     5.71 0.66 0.73 
Any hospital nights F(  2.  3533) =   28.02 0.37 0.79 
Log of hospital nights 
(cond > 0) 
F(  2.   534) =     6.86 0.54 0.45 
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
In the probit regressions, the validity of the exclusion restrictions was tested by including all but one of 
the instruments in the structural equation that controls for endogeneity and testing their joint 
significance with a Wald test [42-43]. The test result does not depend on which instrument is left out. 
With valid exclusion restrictions, these should not be significant predictors of formal care after 
controlling for informal care. 
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Table 7. Interaction terms. Effects of informal care on formal care. Probit coefficients 
(se). 
 Any home 
care  
Any doctor 
visit 
Any GP visit Any 
specialist 
visit  
Any hospital 
nights 
Hours of 
informal care  
-1.05 -0.011 -0.006 0.045 0.049 
 (0.40)** (0.43) (0.31) (2.72)** (2.62)** 
Hours * Nordic  0.69 0.033 0.053 0.002 0.031 
 (0.46) (0.84) (1.52) (0.07) (0.93) 
Hours * Central 0.89 0.016 0.026 -0.039 -0.002 
 (0.39)* (0.51) (0.98) (1.87) (0.08) 
Central 0.17 0.210 0.391 0.054 0.300 
 (0.38) (2.51)* (5.37)** (0.85) (3.65)** 
Nordic 0.61 -0.350 -0.107 -0.641 0.216 
 (0.50) (3.59)** (1.24) (7.49)** (2.11)* 
Observations 2892 3559 3559 3559 3559 
 * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
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Table 8. Interaction terms. Effects of informal care on formal care. OLS coefficients 
(se). 
Interactions # doctor visits  # GP  # specialist visits # hospital nights  
Hours of 
informal care  
0.03 0.00 0.05 0.04 
 (0.01)* (0.01) (0.02)** (0.03 
Hours * Central  0.01 0.04 -0.03 0.01 
 (0.02) (0.02)* (0.02) (0.04) 
Hours * Nordic -0.02 -0.01 -0.07 -0.10 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.03)* (0.06) 
Central -0.17  -0.24 -0.15 0.31 
 (0.04)** (0.05)** (0.06)* (0.15)* 
Nordic -0.60 -0.53 -0.19 0.10 
 (0.05)** (0.06)** (0.09)* (0.18) 
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
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Table 9. Sensitivity analysis. Effect of logged hours of informal care received past 12 
months on formal care among people aged 70 and above. 
Dependent variable* Probit/OLS 
marginal 
effect/coefficie
nt of informal 
care (se) 
N Ivprobit/ 2SLS 
marginal 
effect/coefficie
nt of informal 
care (se) 
N 
Any home care 0.02** (0.00) 1,395 -0.09* (0.04) 1,390 
Any doctor visit -0.00 (0.00) 1,769 0.03 (0.02) 1,755 
Log of doctor visits 
(cond > 0) 
0.03** (0.01) 1,609 0.00 (0.06) 1,605 
Any GP visit 0.00 (0.00) 1,769 0.03 (0.02) 1,755 
Log of GP visits (cond > 
0) 
0.02* (0.01) 1,525 -0.00 (0.06) 1,522 
Any specialist visit 0.01* (0.00) 1,769 0.05 (0.04) 1,760 
Log of specialist visits 
(cond > 0)  
0.01 (0.01) 720 0.00 (0.09) 718 
Any hospital nights 0.01** (0.00) 1,769 0.03 (0.03) 1,764 
Log of hospital nights 
(cond > 0) 
0.02 (0.02) 336 0.05 (0.11) 336 
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
The regressions control for age, age squared, gender, whether born in country, years of education, 
number of health conditions, number of health symptoms, self-reported health, limitations on activity, 
smoking, drinking, sports activities, and other physical activities. In the instrumental variables 
regressions, two variables indicating the number of children and the whether the oldest child lived 
more than 100 kilometres away were used as instruments. An exception was the regressions on having 
any hospital nights, where the age of the oldest child was used instead of the variable indicating the 
number of children. The reason was that the specification using number of children as excluded 
instrument did not pass the test of overidentifying restrictions. Full results are available upon request.  
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Table 10. Sensitivity analysis. Specification test of the instrumental variables 
regression. 
Dependent variable F-test of joint significance 
of excluded instruments 
Test of exclusion 
restrictions (p-value 
of null of valid 
exclusion 
restrictions)* 
Test of null of 
exogeneity (p-value 
of null of exogeneity. 
Wu-Hausman test). 
Any home care F(  2,  2873) = 10.58 0.71 < 0.01 
Any doctor visit F(  2,  3519) =   16.84 0.81 0.06 
Log of doctor visits (cond 
> 0) 
F(  2,  3081) = 15.35 0.37 0.84 
Any GP visit F(  2,  3519) = 21.01 0.01 0.17 
Log of GP visits (cond > 
0) 
F(  2,  2876) =    15.34 0.96 0.69 
Any specialist visit F(  2,  3519) = 21.01 0.81 0.26 
Log of specialist visits 
(cond > 0)  
F(  2,  1394) = 6.64 0.32 0.91 
Any hospital nights F(  2,  3533) = 24.84 0.42 0.52 
Log of hospital nights 
(cond > 0) 
F(  2,   534) = 4.81 0.54 0.80 
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
In the probit regressions, the validity of the exclusion restrictions was tested by including all but one of 
the instruments in the structural equation that controls for endogeneity and testing their joint 
significance with a Wald test [42,43]. The test result does not depend on which instrument is left out. 
With valid exclusion restrictions, these should not be significant predictors of formal care after 
controlling for informal care. 
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NOTES 
                                                 
1 In addition, it could be argued that the supply of informal care is increasing in the amount of the 
expected future bequest. For instance, parents could make future bequests conditional on the supply of 
informal care. Empirical findings support this view; wealthy parents are more frequently visited than 
poorer parents [38]. Moreover, some evidence has been obtained for exchange motives, i.e. financial 
transfers between parents and care-giving children when the parents are still alive [39-41]. 
2 Reher [21] argues that the Muslim domination in southern Europe emphasized vertical relationships 
between generations, where children’s care of their parents in old age and intra-generational co-residence 
are seen as a manifestation of a “strong family”. The Reformation and Germanic tradition in northern 
Europe instead, according to Reher [21] contributed to the development of a weak family characterized by 
people who do not rely on their children in old age and by youths who detach themselves from their 
parents at relatively early ages.  
3 Children here included natural, fostered, and adopted children.  
4 This figure, naturally, varies between the included countries. The lowest fraction, 54%, is found in 
Denmark and the highest, 93%, is found in Italy.  
5 In the case of formal homecare it should be noted that Switzerland and Greece had missing observations 
at the time of writing. 
6 Moreover, due to the survey design, it was not possible to assess the frequency and intensity of the 
different categories of informal care separately.  
7 It should be noted that the interviewer was asked to round up the answers to full hours. 
8 The conditions considered were (1) heart attack, including myocardial infarction or coronary thrombosis 
or any other heart problem including congestive heart failure, (2) high blood pressure or hypertension, (3) 
high blood cholesterol, (4) a stroke or cerebral vascular disease, (5) diabetes or high blood sugar, (6) 
chronic lung disease such as chronic bronchitis or emphysema, (7) asthma, (8) arthritis including 
osteoarthritis or rheumatism, (9) osteoporosis, (10) cancer or malignant tumour including leukaemia or 
lymphoma but excluding minor skin cancers, (11) stomach or duodenal peptic ulcer, (12) Parkinson 
disease, (13) cataracts, (14) hip fractures or femoral fracture. 
9 The list of symptoms included (1) pain in back, knees, hips or any other joint, (2) heart trouble or angina, 
chest pain during exercise, (3) breathlessness, difficulty breathing, (4) persistent cough, (5) swollen legs, (6) 
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sleeping problems, (7) falling down, (8) fear of falling down, (9) dizziness, faints or blackouts, (10) stomach 
or intestine problems, including constipation, air, diarrhoea, (11) incontinence or involuntary loss of urine. 
10 The list of limitation included (1) walking 100 metres, (2) sitting for about two hours, (3) getting up from 
a chair after sitting for long periods (4) climbing several flights of stairs without resting, (5) climbing one 
flight of stairs without resting (6) stooping, kneeling, or crouching, (7) reaching or extending your arms 
above shoulder level, (8) pulling or pushing large objects like a living room chair, (9) lifting or carrying 
weights over 10 pounds/5 kilos, like a heavy bag of groceries, (10) picking up a small coin from a table.  
11 One may suspect that the location of children is endogenous, since children with sick parents may locate 
closer to their parents or vice versa. In Charles & Sevak [2], however, no evidence was found for the 
hypothesis that children’s location respond endogenously to parents’ health.  
12 The computations were performed using the IVPROB programme in STATA, which provides 
asymptotically efficient standard errors. In the first-stage regression, the endogenous explanatory variable is 
treated as linear functions of the instruments and the exogenous variables. In the second stage, the 
prediction from the first stage is included as an explanatory variable in the main equation, instead of the 
suspected original endogenous variable.  
13 Note that no country dummies were included in these regressions.  
14 In order to instrument for the interaction terms as well, the first-stage regression now included the 
interactions (a) between children characteristics and living in central Europe and (b) between children 
characteristics and living in northern Europe. The instruments, again, passed the relevant econometric 
tests. The results of the tests are available on request. 
15 The instruments passed the test of over-identifying restrictions in all cases but one. In the case of GP 
visits, the validity of the exclusion restrictions was rejected.  
